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Abstract
This paper studies collusion in repeated auctions when bidders communicate
prior to each stage auction. For independent and correlated private signals and
general interdependent values, the paper identiÞes conditions under which an
equilibrium collusion scheme is fully efficient in the sense that the bidders
payoff is close to what they get when the object is allocated to the highest
valuation bidder at the reserve price in every period.
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1 Introduction
Collusion is a wide-spread phenomenon in auctions.1 For example, the Japan Fair
Trade Commission (JFTC) issued warnings to 928 Þrms in thirty three collusion
cases in government procurement auctions for year 2001 alone.2 According to a
report from JFTC, colluding Þrms collaborated to predetermine a winning bidder
in each and every one of those cases.
Economic theory suggests that repeated auctions where the same set of bidders
meet time and time again provide an ideal ground for collusion: In repeated auctions,
not only is it easy to enforce the collusive agreement through the threat of reversion
to competitive bidding in the event of a deviation, but it is also possible to transfer
payoffs within a cartel without explicit exchange of money. For example, bidders in
repeated auctions can employ a simple bid rotation collusion scheme which appoints
the winning bidder of a stage auction in turn and hence transfers the continuation
payoff from the current winner to other members of the cartel.
From the point of view of bidders, the optimal collusion scheme is one which is
fully efficient in the sense that their equilibrium payoff is close to what they would
get when the object is allocated at the reserve price to the highest valuation bidder
in every stage auction. For example, the simple bid rotation collusion scheme as
described above may be an improvement over the one-shot equilibrium, but is not
fully efficient since the highest valuation bidder may not win just because it is not
his turn. One important question then is if and when there exists a fully efficient
equilibrium collusion scheme. This paper attempts to answer this question in a
model of collusion with bidder communication.
Formally, the model of repeated auctions considered in this paper is a repeated
game with private information in which the players private signals are drawn iden-
tically and independently across periods. Because of the presence of private signals,
it is known that standard folk theorems for repeated games do not apply except for
some special cases as noted below. This paper shows, however, that with commu-
nication among bidders, an appropriate modiÞcation of the enforceability technique
does yield an analytical framework for this class of games.
We formulate a collusion scheme in which bidders communicate their private
signals with one another prior to every stage auction. At the beginning of each
period, the bidders report their private signals to the center, which then return
1Documentation of collusion in auctions by economists includes Baldwin et al. (1997), Marshall
and Meurer (1995), Pesendorfer (2000), Porter and Zona (1993), and others.
2Recent Activities of JFTC, by the Administrative Office of JFTC (October 2002, in Japanese).
JFTCs investigation is most often initiated by a notiÞcation from the public, and the number of
investigated cases may only be a fraction of all cases.
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instructions to them based on the reported signal proÞle. An instruction rule is a
functional relationship between the reported signal proÞle and the resulting instruc-
tions. For efficient collusion, of course, it is desirable to use the efficient instruction
rule, which, based on the report proÞle, instructs the highest valuation bidder to
bid the reserve price in the stage auction and all other bidders to stay out. It is easy
to see, however, that this instruction rule is not incentive compatible as it gives the
bidders an incentive to overstate their signals. Appropriate adjustment of continua-
tion payoffs is hence essential for the enforcement of such an instruction rule. In the
problem with two bidders, we will show that this adjustment can be accomplished
by transition to the instruction rule called an exclusion rule, which allocates the
object to only one of the bidders regardless of their reported signals. With three or
more bidders, we show that the adjustment can be done through a generalization of
the exclusion rule which allocates the object efficiently within a subset of bidders.
In standard repeated games without private information, the enforceability con-
ditions are expressed in terms of action proÞles: They check whether taking a cer-
tain action is optimal given the discounted sum of todays stage payoff and the
continuation payoff from tomorrow on. With private information, the enforceability
conditions are instead expressed in terms of instruction rules. In other words, they
check whether truth-telling is incentive compatible given the discounted sum of the
current stage payoff implied by the instruction rule, and the continuation payoff.
By the standard argument, identifying the set of equilibrium payoff set reduces
to Þnding a self-decomposable set of repeated game payoffs.3 Following Fudenberg
et al. (1994), the present paper solves the latter problem by Þnding a proÞle of
transfer rules that satisfy weighted budget balance conditions. It describes when
such a transfer rule proÞle exists in problems with two bidders and those with three
or more bidders separately. In both cases, it is shown that a fully efficient collusion
scheme exists under fairly permissive conditions.
In repeated auctions with two bidders, we assume that the private signals are
linearly ordered and affiliated across bidders. Under these conditions, we construct
a redistribution scheme in which the bidder who has reported the higher signal
becomes the winner and his surplus is redistributed to the other bidder in the form
of continuation payoffs. With only two bidders, one bidders gain in the continuation
payoff is necessarily the other bidders loss. As will be seen, this trade-off creates a
bound on the enforceable payoffs. In actual problems, we can check the feasibility of
efficient collusion by explicitly computing this bound. In fact, we derive a sufficient
condition for a full folk theorem when the bidders have linear valuation functions,
and show that efficient collusion is possible when each bidders private signal has a
3See, for example, Abreu et al. (1990), and Fudenberg et al. (1994).
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binary distribution.
When there are three or more bidders, we assume that signals are either (i)
linearly ordered and independent across bidders, or (ii) correlated. In both cases,
we show that any relevant instruction rule is enforceable, and hence that efficient
collusion is achieved. With three or more bidders, the key is to dissociate the
inducement of truth-telling from the budget balance considerations. In other words,
we can choose a continuation payoff function that ignores some bidders report while
letting him absorb the surplus or deÞcit caused by the inducement of truth-telling
from another bidder.
In the analysis of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring, Fudenberg et
al. (1994) discuss repeated adverse selection with communication. SpeciÞcally, they
show that when players publicly announce their private signals, a folk theorem holds
for an adverse selection model with independent private values (IPV), where private
signals have independent distributions across players and their values depend only
on their own signals. Their theorem readily implies that under the IPV assumption,
efficient collusion is possible in repeated auctions when the bidders are sufficiently
patient. On the other hand, the IPV assumption is often difficult to justify in actual
auction environments. It is well recognized in the mechanism design literature that
the IPV assumption posseses a number of special properties that would fail in other
problems. The analysis of Fudenberg et al. (1994) does not make clear whether
efficient collusion is a unique phenomenon in the IPV environment, or a more general
conclusion. The present paper takes a new approach to enforceability and shows that
the conclusion does not hinge on the IPV assumption. Furthermore, it explicitly
characterizes the allocations that appear in the course of collusion.
The paper that is most closely related to the present one is Aoyagi (2003), which
studies a collusion scheme with communication in repeated auctions that improves
on the one-shot Nash equilibrium of the stage auction as well as the simple bid
rotation scheme as described above. It develops the idea of dynamic bid rotation
whereby intertemporal transition between instruction rules takes place as a function
of the current and past reported signals. SpeciÞcally, the winner of the stage t
auction in this scheme is required to stay out of the next few auctions. It should be
noted that the collusion scheme in the present paper is a natural extension of that
in Aoyagi (2003): As mentioned above, the collusion scheme in this paper supports
an efficient payoff vector by switching among simple instruction rules that allocate
the object efficiently within some subset of bidders. The intuition is as follows.
Suppose that the efficient instruction rule is used in stage t. The bidders are given
incentive for truth-telling through the requirement that the stage t winner must stay
out in stage t + 1 (and possibly more). In stage t + 1, then, the scheme switches
5
to the quasi-efficient instruction rule that allocates the object efficiently within the
losers of the stage t auction. These bidders are given incentive for truth-telling
through the requirement that the winner there must stay out in stage t + 2 (and
possibly more), etc. In other words, the collusion scheme proceeds by excluding
recent winners and appoints the winner efficiently from the pool of recent losers. In
short, we demonstrate the exact form of bid rotation required for efficient collusion.
The main difference between the present paper and Aoyagi (2003) is the cardi-
nality of the signal set. Aoyagi (2003) assumes that it is the unit interval [0, 1], while
the present paper assumes that it is a Þnite set. The stronger conclusion ontained
in this paper derives from the self-decomposability techniques available for Þnite-
action games. While it is more standard in the auction literature to use a continuous
signal space, we know of no continuous counterpart to the above technique. For this
technical reason, such a generalization is beyond the scope of this paper and is left
as a topic of future research.
Skrzypacz and Hopenhayn (2002) and Blume and Heidhues (2002) both study
tacit collusion in repeated auctions, where bidders do not communicate prior to
each stage auction. They show that a certain degree of improvement over one-shot
Nash equilibrium as well as simple bid rotation is possible in independent private
values models. The difference in our modeling choice is based on the following con-
siderations: First, while per se illegal, bidder communication is often an integral
part of actual collusion practice, and it is important to understand its implications.
Second, with communication or not, little is known about the full scope of collusion
in repeated auctions. It is hence useful to present a simple framework in which full
efficiency can be achieved. Combined with the study of collusion without commu-
nication, the present analysis would make it possible to discuss the effectiveness of
a strict ban on communication. 4
In a repeated model of oligopoly, Athey and Bagwell (2001) consider collusion
with communication when each players private signal is binary. In the IPV envi-
ronment, they show that efficient collusion is sustained for a discount factor strictly
smaller than unity. The construction takes advantage of the special feature of their
model that the two players valuations are identical to each other at least one half
of the time. Such an event renders every allocation efficient, and thus providing
numerous opportunities for efficient adjustment of continuation payoffs. It does not
appear straightforward to generalize this conclusion to the case with more signals
and/or asymmetric valuations.
Communication mediated by the center as assumed in this paper mimics the
4Of course, the plethora of repeated game equilibria suggests that coordination on a particular
equilibrium requires some form of communication before the play of a repeated game. Blume and
Heidhues (2002) present an anti-folk theorem when no such communication is allowed.
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direct revelation mechanism applied to each stage and hence represents a natural
mode of information transmission. It also allows for a clean presentation of the
enforceability conditions through the use of an instruction rule. However, what is
essential for the argument is the functional relationship between a report proÞle and
bidding behavior in the stage auction as well as continuation play, and the result
continues to hold if we instead assume public communication, where bidders publicly
reveal their private signals.
Although the discussion in this paper is embedded in the repeated auctions
framework, its analysis applies to other problems of repeated adverse selection. They
include, for example, models of repeated oligopoly with private cost signals, and
unemployment insurance.5 In the latter application, for example, each agent either
Þnds a job or not in each period and reports their job status to a social planner. Upon
receiving the agents reports, the planner determines whom to award unemployment
insurance for the current period. This problem has the same structure as the present
one once the social planner is identiÞed with the center.
The paper is organized as follows: A model of repeated auctions is formulated
in the next section. The enforceability of an instruction rule is deÞned in Section 3.
Section 4 describes the feasible as well as self-decomposable payoff sets. Sections 5
and 6 study collusion by two bidders and by three or more bidders, respectively.
2 Model
The set I of I risk-neutral bidders participate in an inÞnite sequence of auctions,
where a single indivisible object is sold in every period through a Þxed auction
format.6 In each period, bidder i draws a private signal si from a Þnite set Si. The
signal proÞle s = (s1, . . . , sI) of I bidders has the joint distribution p in every period
and is independent across periods.
Bidder is valuation of the object sold in each period is a function of the signal
proÞle s = (s1, . . . , sI) in that period and denoted vi(s) ≥ 0. A stage auction is any
transaction mechanism that determines the allocation of the good as well as mone-
tary transfer based on a single sealed bid submitted by each bidder.7 Participation
in the stage auction is voluntary so that the set of each bidders generalized bids is
expressed as B1 = · · · = BI = {N} ∪R+, where N represents no participation.
The rule of the auction is summarized by mappings ωi and ξi (i ∈ I) on the set
B = B1 × · · · × BI of bid proÞles b = (b1, . . . , bI): ωi(b) is the probability that
5See Atkeson and Lucas (1992, 1995), Athey and Bagwell (2001) and Athey et al. (1998).
6Note that the symbol I represents both the set of bidders and its cardinality.
7The restriction to a sealed bid auction is purely for simplicity.
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bidder i is awarded the good, and ξi(b) is his expected payment to the auctioneer.
We assume that ωi and ξi satisfy the following conditions.
1. A bidder makes no payment when he does not participate: ξi(b) = 0 if bi = N .
2. A bidder may win the object only if he submits a bid at or above the reserve
price R ∈ £0,maxs,i vi(s)¢: ωi(b) = 0 if bi ∈ {N} ∪ [0, R).
3. If bidder i bids R and all other bidders stay out, then i wins the object at
price R: ωi(b) = 1 and ξi(b) = R if bi = R and bj = N for all j 6= i.
Note that the above conditions hold for most standard auctions including the Þrst-
and second-price auctions. Consider the Bayesian game in which bidder is (pure)
strategy is a mapping ηi : Si → Bi and his (ex ante) payoff function isX
s∈S
p(s)
©
ωi(η(s))vi(s)− ξi(η(s))
ª
.
Let ∆Bi denote the probability distribution over Bi, and ηi : Si → ∆Bi denote bid-
der is mixed strategy in this game. We assume that this game has a (mixed) Nash
equilibrium η0 = (η01 , . . . , η
0
I ), which describes the non-cooperative bidding behavior
in the stage auction. Let g0i be the corresponding (ex ante) Nash equilibrium payoff
to bidder i.
Collusion in the repeated auction takes the following form: At the beginning of
each period, all bidders report their private signals si to the center. Upon receiving
the report proÞle s = (s1, . . . , sI) ∈ S, the center chooses an instruction to each
bidder i on what to do in the stage auction.
In general, the bidders may report a false signal, and/or disobey the instruction.
Bidder is reporting rule λi chooses report si as a function of his true signal si, and
his bidding rule µi chooses bid bi in the stage action as a function of his signal,
report and instruction. The reporting rule is honest if it always reports the true
signal, and the bidding rule is obedient if it always obeys the instruction. Denote
by λ∗i and µ
∗
i bidder is honest reporting rule and obedient action rule, respectively.
We assume that the identity of the winner of each stage auction (if any) is
publicly observable. For simplicity, we assume that the center is also capable of
observing this information.8 It follows that if any bidder disobeys the centers
instruction and becomes an unexpected winner, it is an observable deviation. On the
other hand, misreporting of a private signal is in general an unobservable deviation.
8If the center does not have this capability, we can replicate the situation by letting the bidders
report the winners identity to the center.
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The center is an institution whose role in each stage is to transform the report
proÞle into instructions. We suppose that the centers instruction to each bidder
is chosen from the set {R,N,E}: instruction R implies that the bidder should
submit the reserve price, N implies that he should stay out, and E implies that
he should play the one-shot NE strategy η0i . An instruction rule d = (d1, . . . , dI)
is a mapping from the set S of report proÞles to the set {R,N,E}I of instruction
proÞles: di(s) ∈ {R,N,E} is the instruction given to bidder i when the report proÞle
equals s ∈ S. At the beginning of each period, the center publicly announces which
instruction rule is used in that period. Let d0 be the one-shot NE instruction rule
such that d0i (s) = E for each s ∈ S and i ∈ I.
Bidder is communication history in period t in the repeated auction game is
the sequence of his reports and instructions in periods 1, . . . , t − 1. On the other
hand, bidder is private history in period t is the sequence of his private signals si
in periods 1, . . . , t− 1. Furthermore, the public history in period t is a sequence of
instruction rules used by the center in periods 1, . . . , t and the identities of winners
in the stage auctions in periods 1, . . . , t− 1.
Bidder is (pure) strategy σi in the repeated auction chooses the pair (λi, µi)
of reporting and bidding rules in each period t as a function of his communication
and private histories in t, and the public history in t. Let σ∗i be bidder is honest
and obedient strategy which plays the pair (λ∗i , µ
∗
i ) of the honest reporting rule and
obedient bidding rule for all histories.
The collusion scheme τ is the centers (contingent) choice of an instruction rule
in every period as a function of communication and public histories. Let δ < 1 be
the bidders common discount factor, and Πi(σ, τ, δ) be bidder is average discounted
payoff (normalized by (1 − δ)) in the repeated game under the proÞle (σ, τ). The
collusion scheme τ is an equilibrium if the proÞle σ∗ = (σ∗1 , . . . ,σ∗I ) of honest and
obedient strategies constitutes a perfect public equilibrium of the repeated game.
Our analysis will focus on the following class of grim-trigger collusion schemes
with two phases: The game starts in the collusion phase, and reverts to the punish-
ment phase forever if and only if the identity of the winner (if any) is inconsistent
with the centers instructions. In the punishment phase, the center chooses the one-
shot NE instruction rule d0 every period. Furthermore, the centers instruction in
the collusion phase is such that all but one bidder is instructed to stay out (N).
In the following sections, we will be interested in supporting payoffs above the
one-shot NE level g0, and consideration of a grim-trigger scheme allows us to sepa-
rate disobedience from misreporting in the following sense. If bidder is continuation
payoff is strictly above his one-shot NE level g0i , and if his discount factor δ < 1 is
sufficiently close to one, then he has no incentive to disobey the centers instruction
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regardless of his reporting strategy. In other words, if a bidder who is instructed
to stay out (N) deviates and wins, the deviation is observable and hence triggers
the punishment. On the other hand, if he disobeys and submits a losing bid, the
deviation may be unobservable but is not proÞtable. Furthermore, a bidder who is
instructed to win with bid R cannot gain by bidding above R or by losing (since
that would be an observable deviation). In what follows, therefore, our analysis will
deal exclusively with the prevention of misreporting.
3 Enforceability of Instruction Rules
DeÞne
gdi (λ) =
X
s∈S
p(s)
©
ωi(d(λ(s))) vi(s)− ξi(d(λ(s)))
ª
.
to be bidder is ex ante expected stage payoff under the instruction rule d when the
bidders use the reporting rule proÞle λ = (λ1, . . . ,λI) ∈ Λ and obey the centers
instruction. Denote by q(s | λ) the probability of the report proÞle s under the
reporting rule proÞle λ ∈ Λ:
q(s | λ) =
X
{s:λ(s)=s}
p(s).
The construction below is an adaptation of Fudenberg et al. (1994) to the repeated
adverse selection framework.
Let W ⊂ RI be a set of payoff vectors. The instruction rule d is (truthfully)
enforceable with respect to δ and W if there exists y = (y1, . . . , yI) : S → W , a
proÞle of continuation payoff functions taking values in W , such that for every i ∈ I
and λi ∈ Λi,
(1− δ) gdi (λ∗) + δ
X
s∈S
q(s | λ∗) yi(s) ≥ (1− δ) gdi (λi,λ∗−i) + δ
X
s∈S
q(s | λi,λ∗−i) yi(s).
In other words, truth-telling maximizes the (discounted) sum of todays stage payoff
and the continuation payoff from tomorrow on among all possible reporting rules.
Given a collection D of instruction rules, the set W is locally self-decomposable
with respect to D if for each w ∈ W , there exist a discount factor δ < 1 and an
open neighborhood U of w such that for any u = (u1, . . . , uI) ∈ U , there exists an
instruction rule d ∈ D such that d is enforceable with respect to δ and W through
some continuation payoff function proÞle y = (y1, . . . , yI) : S →W , and
ui = (1− δ) gdi (λ∗) + δ
X
s∈S
q(s | λ∗) yi(s)
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for every i ∈ I.
As in Fudenberg et al. (1994), the case where the set W is a hyperplane is of
particular importance in our analysis. For any α ∈ RI such that α 6= 0, note that if
d is enforceable with respect to δ < 1 and the hyperplaneW = {u ∈ RI : α ·u = 0},
then for any δ0 < 1 and ζ ∈ RI , d is enforceable with respect to δ0 and a parallel
hyperplane W 0 = {u ∈ RI : α · (u − ζ) = 0}.9 For this reason, we say that an
instruction rule d is enforceable with respect to α without reference to δ and the
particular (α-normal) hyperplane. Note that enforceability with respect to the α-
normal hyperplane through the origin involves the incentive compatibility conditions
and the weighted budget balance condition α · y(s) = 0 (s ∈ S).
The set W ⊂ RI is smooth if it is closed and convex, and if its interior is non-
empty and its boundary is a C2-manifold. Following Fudenberg et al. (1994), we
associate the local self-decomposability of a smooth set W with enforceability with
respect to its supporting hyperplanes. Formally, a smooth setW is decomposable on
tangent hyperplanes (given the set D of instruction rules) if for every point w on the
boundary of W , there exists an instruction rule d ∈ D such that (i) gd(λ∗) and W
are separated by the supporting hyperplane H of W at w, and (ii) d is enforceable
with respect to H.
Let α 6= 0 be any I-dimensional vector, and
A(α) =
©
d : d is enforceable with respect to α
ª
.
Given any set D of instruction rules, deÞne
V ∗(D) =
\
α 6=0
©
u ∈ RI : u ≥ g0, α · u ≤ max
d∈D∩A(α)
α · gd(λ∗)ª.
By Theorem 4.1 of Fudenberg et al. (1994), if a smooth set W is decomposable
on tangent hyperplanes given the set D of instruction rules, then W is locally self-
decomposable with respect to D. Finally, Lemma 4.2 of Fudenberg et al. (1994)
states that if W is compact, convex, and locally self-decomposable with respect to
some D, then there exists a discount factor δ < 1 such that for any δ > δ, any
point w ∈ W is sustained as a payoff vector of an equilibrium collusion scheme
whose instruction rules are chosen from D. The following lemma summarizes the
argument.
9If d is enforceable with respect to δ and W through y, then it is enforceable with respect to δ0
and W 0 through y0 : S →W 0 ≡ H(α, ζ0) deÞned by
y0(s) = ζ0 +
δ(1− δ0)
δ0(1− δ) {y(s)− ζ}.
11
Lemma 1 Suppose that V ∗(D) has a non-empty interior for some set D of in-
struction rules. Then any smooth subset W of the interior of V ∗(D) is locally
self-decomposable with respect to D. Hence, for any u ∈ V ∗(D) and ² > 0, there
exists δ < 1 such that the following holds if δ > δ: There exists an equilibrium col-
lusion scheme τ which chooses instruction rules from D and yields the payoff vector
Π(τ,σ∗, δ) satisfying kΠ(τ,σ∗, δ)− uk < ².
Proof Take any smooth set W ⊂ intV ∗(D). Let w be a point on the boundary of
W , and α 6= 0 be the normal vector of the supporting hyperplane of W at w so that
α ·u ≤ α ·w for any u ∈W . Since w ∈ V ∗(D), there exists d ∈ D such that d ∈ A(α)
and α · w ≤ α · gd(λ∗). Hence, W is decomposable on the tangent hyperplane at w
using d. Therefore, W is decomposable on tangent hyperplanes, and hence is locally
self-decomposable with respect to D by Theorem 4.1 of Fudenberg et al. (1994).
The desired conclusion then follows from their Lemma 4.2. //
4 Instruction Rules for Bid Rotation
For efficient collusion, the bidder with the highest valuation should be instructed to
bid the reserve price in the stage auction while other bidders are instructed to stay
out. We begin with the description of such an instruction rule.
Since the signal space Si is Þnite, more than one bidder may share the same
highest valuation with positive probability. This suggests the possible multiplicity
of efficient allocations according to different tie-breaking rules. To capture this
possibility, we introduce a permutation on I that describes each players rank in
tie-breaking. Let ΦI be the set of permutations on I: each φ ∈ ΦI is a one-to-one
mapping from I to itself. For any φ ∈ ΦI , let dφ∗ denote the efficient instruction
rule deÞned as follows: Given the report proÞle s ∈ S, dφ∗ instructs the bidder
with the highest valuation (based on s) to bid R if his valuation is higher than
the reserve price R. If there exist two or more bidders with the highest valuation,
then bidder i becomes the winner if and only if his index φ(i) according to φ is the
smallest among all such bidders. Any other bidder is instructed to stay out. If we
let I∗(s) = argmaxj∈I vj(s) be the set of bidders with the highest valuation under
the signal proÞle s, then dφ∗ can formally be described as:
dφ∗i (s) =
(
R if i ∈ I∗(s), φ(i) ≤ φ(j) for every j ∈ I∗(s), and vi(s) ≥ R,
N otherwise.
For each i ∈ I, denote by gφ∗i bidder is (ex ante) stage payoff gd
φ∗
i (λ
∗) associated
with dφ∗. If we let
F = Co {gφ∗ : φ ∈ ΦI},
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then F is the set of (Þrst-best) efficient payoff vectors. In the two-bidder problem, for
example, the set F is an interval on the negative 45-degree line given the transferable
utilities. Our analysis will assume that collusion is potentially proÞtable, i.e., the
one-shot Nash equilibrium is (strictly) Pareto dominated by any point on F : g0i <
gφ∗i for every i ∈ I and φ ∈ ΦI .
We will next describe instruction rules that are used for the adjustment of con-
tinuation payoffs. For each i ∈ I, let di be an asymmetric instruction rule deÞned
as follows: Given the report proÞle s ∈ S, di instructs (i) bidder i to bid R if his
valuation vi(s) exceeds R, and to stay out otherwise, and (ii) bidder j (j 6= i) to
stay out:
dii(s) =
(
R if vi(s) > R
N otherwise,
and dij(s) = N for any s.
In other words, bidder i is the only potential winner under di. Let gij = g
di
j (λ
∗) be
bidder js (ex ante) stage payoff under di. We have gij = 0 if j 6= i. For any i, we
call di an exclusion rule.
The following lemma states that the exclusion rule di and the one-shot NE
instruction rule d0 are both enforceable with respect to any vector α.
Lemma 2 For any α 6= 0, di (i ∈ I) and d0 are truthfully enforceable with respect
to α: α 6= 0 ⇒ di, d0 ∈ A(α).
Proof Whether d = di or d = d0, gdi (λ
∗) ≥ gdi (λi,λ∗−i) for every i ∈ I so that d is
enforceable with respect to α through y(·) ≡ 0.
We next consider instruction rules that entail an efficient allocation for some
subset of bidders. Formally, given the signal proÞle s ∈ S and a subset J ⊂ I of
bidders, denote by I∗(s, J) = argmaxi∈J vi(s) the set of bidders with the highest
valuation in set J . For each permutation φ ∈ ΦJ on the subset J , deÞne d(· | φ, J)
to be the J-efficient instruction rule such that
di(s | φ, J) =
(
R if i ∈ I∗(s, J) and φ(i) ≤ φ(j) for any j ∈ I∗(s, J),
N otherwise.
In other words, each J-efficient instruction rule allocates the good efficiently within
the set J while excluding all other bidders. Note that the I-efficient rule d(· | φ, I)
is equivalent to the efficient rule dφ∗, and that the {i}-efficient rule is equivalent to
the exclusion rule di.
We now deÞne
D∗ = {d0} ∪ {d(· | φ, J) : J ⊂ I, J 6= ∅, φ ∈ ΦJ},
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and
U∗ = Co {g(d) : d ∈ D∗}.
In other words, D∗ is a collection of all the J-efficient instruction rules for every
non-empty subset J of I and the one-shot Nash equilibrium instruction rule, and
U∗ is the set of payoff vectors that can be expressed as a convex combination of the
payoffs associated with those instruction rules. Let V ⊂ RI be deÞned by
V = U∗ ∩ {u ∈ RI : u ≥ g0}.
We will be interested in supporting payoff vectors in the set V by equilibrium col-
lusion schemes.
It can be seen that the efficiency frontier of V equals F introduced earlier.
Given any vector α ∈ RI , let Jα = {j : αj > 0} be the set of bidders given
positive weights by α. Theorem 3 below shows that if, for each α 6= 0, the J-efficient
rule d(· | φ, J) is enforceable with respect to α for every J ⊂ Jα and φ ∈ ΦJ , then
every point in set V can be supported as an equilibrium payoff vector when the
bidders are patient.
Theorem 3 Suppose that d(· | φ, J) ∈ A(α) for any vector α 6= 0, J ⊂ Jα with
J 6= ∅, and φ ∈ ΦJ . Then V = V ∗(D∗).
Proof For any J ⊂ I (J 6= ∅), φ ∈ ΦJ , and i ∈ I, write g(φ, J) = g(d(· | φ, J)).
Note Þrst that U∗ equals the intersection of all the closed half-spaces containing
{g(d) : d ∈ D∗} (Rockafellar (1970, Corollary 11.5.1):
U∗ =
\
α 6=0
{u ∈ RI : α · u ≤ max
d∈D∗
α · g(d)}.
It then follows from the deÞnition of V ∗(D∗) that V ⊃ V ∗(D∗).
We next show that V ⊂ V ∗(D∗). For this, take any u ∈ V and let α 6= 0 be
given. Since u ∈ U∗, there exists d ∈ D∗ such that α · u ≤ α · g(d). The proof is
complete if we show that there exists d¯ ∈ D∗ ∩A(α) such that α · g(d) ≤ α · g(d¯).
If d = d0 ∈ D∗, then we can let d¯ = d0 since d0 ∈ A(α) by Lemma 2.
Otherwise, d = d(· | φ, J 0) ∈ D∗ for some J 0 ⊂ I (J 0 6= ∅) and φ ∈ ΦJ 0 . Let
J = J 0 ∩ Jα.
If J = ∅, then take any φ0 ∈ ΦJα and let d¯ = g(φ0, Jα). We then have d¯ ∈ A(α)
by assumption, and also α · g(d) ≤ 0 ≤ α · g(d¯).
If J 6= ∅, We let d¯ = d(· | φ¯, J), where φ¯ is the permutation on J obtained by
restricting φ (on J 0) to J : For any i, j ∈ J ,
φ¯(i) ≤ φ¯(j)⇔ φ(i) ≤ φ(j).
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Since αi ≤ 0 for i ∈ J 0 \ Jα, and αi > 0 and gi(φ¯, J) ≥ gi(φ, J 0) for i ∈ J , we have
α · g(d) =
X
i∈J
αigi(φ, J
0) +
X
i∈J 0\Jα
αigi(φ, J
0) ≤
X
i∈J
αigi(φ, J
0) ≤ α · g(d¯).
Since d¯ = d(· | φ¯, J) ∈ A(α) by assumption, we obtain the desired conclusion. //
5 Two Bidders: Redistribution Scheme
This section analyzes the problem with two bidders. We compute an explicit for-
mula for continuation payoff functions that enforce the efficient instruction rules.
These continuation payoff functions have the property that the winners surplus in
the present stage auction is transfered to the loser. We Þrst make the following
assumptions.
Assumption 1 For i = 1, 2, the set of signal Si = {s0, s1, . . . , sK} is linearly
ordered in the sense that Si ⊂ R+ with s0 < s1 < · · · < sK . Furthermore, the
probability distribution p of signal proÞle s has full support over S, and satisÞes the
monotone likelihood ratio property :
pj(s
0
j | si)
pj(sj | si) ≤
pj(s
0
j | s0i)
pj(sj | s0i)
if s0i ≥ si and s0j ≥ sj (i = 1, 2, j 6= i).(1)
Assumption 2 The valuation functions v1 and v2 are monotone: vi(s
0) ≥ vi(s) if
s0 ≥ s, and satisÞes the single crossing property: vi(s) ≥ vj(s) ⇔ si ≥ sj .
With I = 2, the monotone likelihood ratio property in Assumption 1 is equivalent
to affiliation in Milgrom and Weber (1982). Note that Assumption 2 holds in a
private values model where vi(s) = si for every s ∈ S and i ∈ I, and more generally,
in a symmetric linear valuation model discussed in the second half of this section. We
also assume in this section that the reserve price R equals zero. For the permutation
φ ∈ ΦI such that φ(i) = 1 and φ(j) = 2, we write dij∗ for the efficient instruction
rule dφ∗. Hence, the set D∗ of relevant instruction rules can be expressed as
D∗ = {d0, d1, d2, d12∗, d21∗}.
In this section, we use the convention that the Þrst argument of vi is si (own signal)
and the second is sj (the other bidders signal), i.e., vi(s
k, sl) = vi(si = s
k, sj = s
l).
As mentioned above, our focus in this section is on a redistribution scheme in
which the winners surplus in each stage auction is redistributed to the loser through
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an adjustment in continuation payoffs. Such a transfer has a natural interpretation,
and is most likely at the heart of many actual collusion schemes. The theoretical
analysis of such a collusion scheme is Þrst provided by McAfee and McMillan (1992)
under the assumption that side transfer among bidders is possible. Aoyagi (2003)
extends their analysis and shows that monetary transfer can partially be compen-
sated by the adjustment in continuation payoffs in repeated auctions. The scheme
analyzed in Aoyagi (2003) is described in more detail as follows: It begins with the
efficient instruction rule d∗, and switches with positive probability to the exclusion
rule dj when bidder i wins the stage auction today.10 In this event, dj is used for
a Þxed number of periods and then play returns to the original phase where d∗ is
used. The same process is repeated thereafter unless there is a disobedience, which
would trigger reversion to the one-shot NE instruction rule d0. It can be seen that
this collusion scheme embodies the idea of redistribution as described above, but
entails inefficiency since the (inefficient) exclusion rules di are invoked with positive
probability. The redistribution scheme of this section uses the same type of rotation
over efficient and exclusion rules, but inefficiency is eliminated by the use of the
self-decomposability argument.
Formally, let xi : Si → R+ and xj : Sj → R+ be non-negative functions of is
and js reports, respectively, and let continuation payoff functions y = (y1, y2) be
given by
yi(s) =
−xi(si) if si ≥ sjαj
αi
xj(sj) otherwise,
and yj(s) =

αi
αj
xi(si) if si ≥ sj
−xj(sj) otherwise.
(2)
It is clear that the budget balance condition α · y(s) = 0 holds for any s ∈ S.
We can think of xi(si) as a compensation payment from bidder i to bidder j when
the former wins with report si. We will choose xi and xj so that they satisfy the
incentive compatibility conditions. For this, we will Þrst consider local incentive
conditions that guarantee that the bidders do not have incentive to report a signal
one-step above or below its true value. We will then show that xi and xj chosen to
satisfy these conditions are monotone increasing functions of the signals when the
ratio αj/αj is not extreme. We will Þnally globalize the local incentive properties of
xi and xj using the monotonicity and the monotone likelihood ratio property. The
last step is standard in the mechanism design literature.
Formally, for i = 1, 2 and j 6= i, let
ρk,lj =
pj(s
l | si = sk)P
sj≤sl pj(sj | si = sk)
(k, l = 0, 1, . . . ,K)
10Since Aoyagi (2003) considers a continuous signal set, the efficient instruction rule does not
need to specify a tie-breaking rule.
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be a hazard rate of sj conditional on si = s
k. By the monotone likelihood property
(1), we have ρk,lj ≤ ρk
0,l
j if k ≤ k0. For each k = 1, . . . , K, deÞne θkij ≤ 1 by
θkij =
ρk−1,kj vi(s
k−1, sk)
vj(sk, sk)− {1− ρk−1,kj } vi(sk−1, sk−1)
,
and let
θij = max
k
θkij .
It should be noted that θij ≤ 1 since vj(sk, sk) = vi(sk, sk) ≥ vi(sk−1, sk) by As-
sumption 2. The following lemma proves the existence of incentive compatibility
transfer functions when the exchange rate θ for transfer between the two bidders is
not extreme.
Lemma 4 Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. If α = (α1,α2) is such that α1,
α2 > 0 and θ = αj/αi ∈ [θij , 1], then there exist functions xi and xj such that the
efficient instruction rule dij∗ is enforceable with respect to α through y in (2).
Proof See the Appendix.
The exact forms of the functions xi and xj are presented in the Appendix. To see
why we need a bound on the exchange rate θ for transfer between the two bidders,
suppose for example that money worth one dollar to bidder j is worth very little
to bidder i. It will then be the case that any monetary transfer to/from bidder j
designed to induce truth-telling from him will be insufficient to induce truth-telling
from bidder i.
Let
V 0 = {u ∈ R2+ : ui + θijuj ≤ gii for i = 1, 2, j 6= i}.
In the two-dimensional plane (u1, u2), the set V
0 is the area below the two straight
lines u2 = −(u1 − g11)/θ12 and u2 = −θ21 u1 + g22 (Figure 5).
The next theorem asserts any payoff vector in the intersection V 0 ∩ V can be
supported in equilibrium when the instruction rules are chosen from D∗.
Theorem 5 Suppose that I = 2 and that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then V 0∩V ⊂
V ∗(D∗). That is, if V 0 ∩ V has a non-empty interior, then for any u ∈ V 0 ∩ V
and ² > 0, there exists δ < 1 such that the following holds for δ > δ: There
exists an equilibrium collusion scheme τ which chooses instruction rules from D∗ =
{d0, d1, d2, d12∗, d21∗} and yields the payoff vector Π(τ,σ∗, δ) satisfying kΠ(τ, σ∗, δ)−
uk < ².
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Proof See the Appendix.
It follows that every payoff vector in V can be supported in equilibrium when
V ⊂ V 0. Note that the latter condition is equivalent to g12∗, g21∗ ∈ V 0 given our
assumption that the efficient payoff vectors Pareto dominate the one-shot NE point
g0. Hence, we have the following corollary to Theorem 5.
Corollary 6 Under the conditions of Theorem 5, V = V ∗(D∗) if g12∗, g21∗ ∈ V 0.
On the other hand, even when V 6⊂ V 0, some efficient payoff vectors can still
be supported in equilibrium if V 0 has a non-empty intersection with the efficiency
frontier F . For the rest of this section, we will focus attention on a linear valuation
model and derive a sufficient condition for efficient collusion.
Assumption 3 The set Si = {s0, . . . , sK} of signals equals {0, 1/K, . . . , 1−1/K, 1},
and the valuation function is linear in the sense that vi(s) = csi+(1−c)sj for i = 1, 2,
j 6= i, and c ∈ [1/2, 1].
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The linear valuation function encompasses the private values model (c = 1) as
well as the pure common values model (c = 1/2). The requirement c ≥ 1/2 is
equivalent to the single crossing condition in Assumption 2, which expresses the
idea that ones own signal is at least as important as the other bidders signal in
determining valuation. It is clear that Assumption 3 implies Assumption 2.
The following theorem identiÞes the conditions on the distribution of private
signals under which every point on the efficiency frontier can be supported as an
equilibrium payoff.
Theorem 7 Suppose that I = 2 and that Assumptions 1 and 3 hold. Then V ⊂ V 0
if and only if
ρk−1,kj (k − c)
1 + ρk−1,kj (k − 1)
≤ 1− c+ cνij
(1− c)νij + c ,(3)
where νij =
P
sj>si
p(s) siP
sj>si
p(s) sj
< 1.
Proof See the Appendix.
Since the left-hand side of (3) is increasing in ρk−1,kj (≤ 1) and in k (≤ K), and
the right-hand side is increasing in νij (≥ 0), a sufficient condition for (3) can be
obtained by replacing these parameters by their bounds.
Corollary 8 Suppose that I = 2 and that Assumptions 1 and 3 hold. Then V ⊂ V 0
if 1− cK ≤ 1−cc .
By Corollary 8, we have V ⊂ V 0 under Assumptions 1 and 3 if either
1. c is sufficiently close to 1/2 (i.e., values are almost common), or
2. K = 1 (i.e., the private signal of each bidder is binary Si = {0, 1}).
The Þrst observation above on the almost common value environment is intuitively
clear: As c→ 1/2, gii approaches gij∗i +gij∗j (from below) since the allocation induced
by the exclusion rule di becomes almost efficient. Geometrically, the line connecting
points gij∗ and gi (as well as gji∗ and gj) approximates the negative 45-degree line.
It follows that the inequality gij∗i + θij g
ij∗
j ≤ gii holds for any θij < 1.
Example 1 Suppose that the signals si and sj are independent and have the uni-
form distribution: pi(si) = 1/(K + 1) for any si ∈ Si (i = 1, 2). In this example, it
can be checked that
νij =
P
sj>si
p(s) siP
sj>si
p(s) sj
=
K − 1
2K + 1
,
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and that
ρk−1,kj =
1
k + 1
.
By Theorem 7, hence, V ⊂ V 0 if
c ≤ 3K
2 + 5K + 1−√9K4 + 18K3 − 5K2 − 14K + 1
2(K + 2)
.
We can verify that the right-hand side approaches 1 as K → ∞. In other words,
for any c < 1, there exists K such that efficient collusion is possible if the number
of each bidders private signals is at least K. We also see that the inequality fails
to hold (i.e., gij∗ /∈ V 0) if, for example, c = 1 (private values) and K ≥ 2. However,
it can be veriÞed that F has a non-empty intersection with V 0 for any value of K
and c. To see this, note that the payoffs corresponding to the efficient instruction
rule d12∗ can be computed as:
g12∗1 =
KX
k=0
kX
l=0
ck + (1− c)l
K
1
(K + 1)2
=
1 + c
2K(K + 1)2
KX
k=0
k(1 + k) =
1 + c
2
K + 2
3(K + 1)
,
and
g12∗2 =
KX
k=0
k−1X
l=0
ck + (1− c)l
K
1
(K + 1)2
=
1 + c
2K(K + 1)2
KX
k=0
k2 =
1 + c
2
2K + 1
6(K + 1)
.
It follows that the symmetric point g∗ = (g12∗ + g21∗)/2 on the efficiency frontier is
given by
g∗1 = g
∗
2 =
1
2
(g12∗1 + g
12∗
2 ) =
1 + c
2
4K + 5
12(K + 1)
.
It is also seen that bidder is exclusion payoff equals gii = 1/2. This implies that the
bound on the exchange rate is given by
θij = θ
K
ij =
K − c
K(1 + c)
.
It then follows that for any K ≥ 1,
g∗i + θij g
∗
j =
(4K + 5) {(2 + c)K − c}
24K(K + 1)
<
1
2
= gii .
As depicted in Figure 1, hence, the symmetric efficiency point g∗ = (g∗1 , g
∗
2) ∈ V 0.
By Theorem 5, therefore, there exists an equilibrium collusion scheme whose payoff
vector approximates g∗ provided that the discount factor is close to one.
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6 Three or More Bidders
With three or more bidders, efficient collusion is obtained under very weak assump-
tions. As mentioned in the Introduction, the key advantage of having more than
two bidders is that inducement of truth-telling can be considered separately from
the budget balance requirement. The particular construction below is based on that
in Aoyagi (1998). 11
Recall from Theorem 3 that any payoff vector in V can be sustained in equilib-
rium if the J-efficient instruction rule d(· | φ, J) is enforceble with respect to α for
every α 6= 0, J ⊂ Jα (J 6= ∅), and φ ∈ ΦJ . We Þrst derive some general properties
that can be used for the analysis of speciÞc cases in Subsections 6.1 and 6.2.
Since d(· | φ, {i}) = di is enforceable with respect to any α 6= 0 by Lemma 2,
suppose that Jα = {1, . . . , n} for some n ≥ 2, and let φ ∈ ΦJα be given. By the
deÞnition of d(· | φ, Jα), the enforceability conditions for bidders n + 1, . . . , I are
satisÞed if we take yn+1(·) = · · · = yI(·) ≡ 0. For bidders 1, . . . , n, we express their
enforceability conditions in matrix form. For each i = 1, . . . , n, let Λ0i = Λi \ {λ∗i }
be the set of untruthful reporting rules, mi = |Λ0i | and m =
Pn
i=1 mi. For any
reporting rule proÞle λ, let q(· | λ) = ¡q(s | λ)¢
s∈S represent the |S|-dimensional
vector of probability distributions of report proÞles under λ. Denote by Bi the
mi × |S| matrix whose row equals
bi(λi) = q(· | λ∗)− q(· | λi,λ∗−i) (λi ∈ Λ0i ).
In other words, each row of Bi corresponds to the difference in probability distri-
butions of report proÞles between λ∗i and λi ( 6= λ∗i ). Write d = d(· | φ, Jα) for
simplicity, and let vi(λi) = g
d
i (λi,λ
∗
−i)−gdi (λ∗), and vi be the mi-dimensional vector
vi =
¡
vi(λi)
¢
λi∈Λ0i
. It follows that d is enforceable with respect to α if there exist
y1, . . . , yn ∈ RS such that
Bi yi ≥ vi for i = 1, . . . , n, and
nX
i=1
αiyi = 0.(4)
Note that we have set δ = 1/2 in the expression of enforceability above based on
the remark in Section 3. Eliminating yn using the second condition and writing
βi = αi/αn > 0 (i = 1, . . . , n− 1), we can further rewrite (4) as:
B y ≥ v,(5)
11See Kandori and Matsushima (1998) for a related idea.
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where
B =

B1 O
. . .
O Bn−1
−β1Bn · · · −βn−1Bn
 , y =
 y1...
yn−1
 , and v =
v1...
vn
 .
Therefore, d is enforceable with respect to α if the inequality (5) has a solution y.
The following lemma is a simple application of the theorem of the alternatives.
Lemma 9 Inequality (5) has a solution y if and only if for any (γ1, . . . , γn) such
that γi ∈ Rmi+ (i = 1, . . . , n),
γiBi − βiγnBn = 0 for every i = 1, . . . , n− 1 ⇒
nX
i=1
γi · vi ≤ 0.
Proof See the Appendix.
The following lemma states the conditions under which the budget balance re-
quirement
P
i αiyi = 0 can be ignored.
Lemma 10 For every i ∈ J = {1, . . . , n} and j 6= i, if there exists z : S → R such
that Bi z ≥ vi and Bj z = 0, then (4) has a solution y = (y1, . . . , yn) : S → Rn.
Proof In view of Lemma 9, suppose that γiBi−βiγnBn = 0 (i = 1, . . . , n−1) for
some (γ1, . . . , γn) ≥ 0. For any i < n, if we multiply from the right zi ∈ RS such
that Bi zi ≥ vi and Bn zi = 0, then
0 = γiBi zi − βiγnBn zi = γiBi zi ≥ γi · vi.
Likewise, if we multiply zn ∈ RS such that Bi zn = 0 and Bn zn ≥ vn, then
0 = γiBi zn − βiγnBn zn = −βiγnBn zn ≤ −βiγn · vn,
which implies γn · vn ≤ 0. It hence follows that
Pn
i=1 γi · vi ≤ 0. //
The simplest way to have Bj z = 0 is to make z independent of js report as
shown in the lemma below. For j ∈ I, let Gj ⊂ RS be the set of continuation payoff
functions that do not depend on js report:
Gj =
©
z ∈ RS : z(s) = z(s0) if s−j = s0−j
ª
.
The following lemma is immediate.
Lemma 11 If z ∈ Gj , then Bj z = 0.
Proof See the Appendix.
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6.1 Independent Signals
In this section, we make the following assumptions about the signal distribution and
the valuation functions.
Assumption 4 For every i ∈ I, the signal set Si = {s0, s1, . . . , sK} ⊂ R+ for
s0 < s1 < · · · < sK . Furthermore, the probability distribution p of signal proÞle s
has full support over S, and is independent: p(s) =
Q
i pi(si).
Assumption 5 The valuation functions v1, . . . , vI are monotone in the own signal :
vi(s
0
i, s−i) ≥ vi(si, s−i) for s0i ≥ si.
Fix any J ⊂ I such that |J | ≥ 2 and φ ∈ ΦJ , and consider the instruction rule
d = d(· | φ, J). For i ∈ J and l = 0, 1, . . . , K, let Z¯i(sl | φ, J) ⊂ S−i be the set of
signal proÞles s−i = (sj)j 6=i of bidders other than i such that according to d(· | φ, J),
i becomes the winner and instructed to bid R under (si = s
l, s−i):
Z¯i(s
l | φ, J) =
n
s−i ∈ S−i : di(si = sl, s−i | φ, J) = R
o
.
Let Zi(s
l | φ, J) = Z¯i(sl | φ, J) \ Z¯i(sl−1 | φ, J). In other words, Zi(sl | φ, J) is
the set of s−is against which bidder i wins when reporting si = sl but loses when
reporting si = s
l−1. For any i ∈ J , j 6= i, k = 0, 1, . . . ,K, and l = 1, . . . , K, deÞne
wji (s
k, sl | φ, J) =
P
s−i∈Zi(sl|φ,J) {vi(si = sk, s−i)−R} p−i(s−i)
pj(sj = sl)
.
It then follows from Assumption 5 that for any k, k0 = 0, 1 . . . , K and l = 1, . . . ,K,
wji (s
k0 , sl | φ, J) ≥ wji (sk, sl | φ, J) if k0 ≥ k.(6)
For any j 6= i, let
ρlj =
pj(sj = s
l)P
sj≤sl pj(sj)
(l = 0, 1, . . . ,K),
and consider a continuation payoff function z : S → R such that
z(s) =
(
−xi(si) if si ≥ sj
0 otherwise,
(7)
where xi : Si → R+ is a non-negative function of is report deÞned recursively by
xi(s
0) = 0,
xi(s
k) = ρkj w
j
i (s
k−1, sk | φ, J) + (1− ρkj ) xi(sk−1) (k = 1, . . . ,K).
(8)
23
According to z, is continuation payoff depends only on his and another bidder js
reports. Just as in the redistribution scheme for two bidders, is continuation payoff
is reduced when he reports a higher signal than j. The lemma below shows that
z deÞned above makes truth-telling incentive compatible. Unlike in the two-bidder
case, however, the required adjustment in bidder is transfer does not need to come
from bidder j, but can come from yet another bidder. This slackness is what permits
stonger conclusions with more than two bidders.
Lemma 12 Under Assumptions 4 and 5, Bi z ≥ vi for z given in (7).
Proof See the Appendix.
Since z is a function of the reports of only two bidders, there is at least one
other bidder h for whom z ∈ Gh and hence Bh z = 0 by Lemma 11. This along with
Lemmas 10 and 12 as well as Theorem 3 yields the following theorem.
Theorem 13 Suppose that I ≥ 3 and that Assumptions 4 and 5 hold. For any
u ∈ V and ² > 0, there exists δ < 1 such that the following holds if δ > δ: There
exists an equilibrium collusion scheme τ which chooses instruction rules from D∗
and yields the payoff vector Π(τ,σ∗, δ) satisfying kΠ(τ, σ∗, δ)− uk < ².
6.2 Correlated Signals
When private signals are correlated, continuation payoffs can be determined using
the functional relationship between a bidders private signal and the probability
distribution of other bidders signal proÞles. When there exist three or more bid-
ders, use of such a mechanism yields an extremely powerful conclusion that does
not depend on the detailed speciÞcation of the valuation functions or the signal
distribution. The analysis in this subsection draws heavily on Aoyagi (1998).
For each si ∈ Si, let p−i(· | si) and p−i−j(· | si) denote the following vectors of
conditional probabilities:
p−i(· | si) =
¡
p−i(s−i | si)
¢
s−i∈s−i ,
p−i−j(· | si) =
¡
p−i−j(s−i−j | si)
¢
s−i−j∈S−i−j .
Assumption 6 The probability distribution p of the private signals satisfy p−i−j(· |
si) 6= p−i−j(· | s0i) for any si 6= s0i and i 6= j.
When the set of probability distributions p of s ∈ S is identiÞed with the (|S|−1)-
dimensional simplex ∆|S|−1, Assumption 6 holds generically in this set as long as
|Si| ≥ 2 for each i ∈ I. In particular, it holds when the distribution satisÞes
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affiliation with strict inequality. Fix any J ⊂ I such that |J | ≥ 2 and φ ∈ ΦJ and
consider the instruction rule d = d(· | φ, J).
Lemma 14 Suppose that I ≥ 3 and that Assumption 6 holds. For any i, j ∈ I
(i 6= j), there exists a continuation payoff function z ∈ Gj such that Bi z ≥ vi.
Proof See the Appendix.
Combining Lemmas 10 and 14, and Theorem 3, we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 15 Suppose that I ≥ 3 and that Assumption 6 holds. Then for any u ∈ V
and ² > 0, there exists δ < 1 such that the following holds if δ > δ: There exists an
equilibrium collusion scheme τ which chooses instruction rules from D∗ and yields
the payoff vector Π(τ,σ, δ) satisfying kΠ(τ,σ, δ)− uk < ².
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 4 For ρk,li deÞned in the text, let xi and xj be deÞned recursively
by
xi(s
0) = xj(s
0) = 0,
xi(s
k) = xi(s
k−1) + ρk−1,kj
h
vi(s
k−1, sk)− tk−1
− ρk−1,k−1i
©
θvj(s
k−1, sk−1)− tk−1ªi,
xj(s
k) = xj(s
k−1) + ρk−1,k−1i
h
vj(s
k−1, sk−1)− 1
θ
tk−1
i
(k = 1, . . . , K),
(9)
where
tk = xi(s
k) + θxj(s
k).
The functions in (9) are derived from the one-step upward incentive conditions for
truth-telling, which ensure that the bidders do not report a signal one-step above
its true value. The proof proceeds in three steps. The Þrst step shows that xi and
xj thus deÞned are monotone. The second step shows that they do satisfy the local
(both upward and downward) incentive conditions. The third step concludes by
demonstrating the global incentive conditions.
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Step 1 For θ =
αj
αi
∈ [θij , 1], both xi and xj are increasing: xi(sk+1) ≥ xi(sk) and
xj(s
k+1) ≥ xj(sk) for k = 0, 1, . . . , K − 1.
Write ∆ki = xi(s
k) − xi(sk−1) and ∆kj = xj(sk) − xj(sk−1) (k = 1, . . . ,K). It
suffices to show that ∆ki , ∆
k
j ≥ 0 for each k. We Þrst show by induction that
tk ≤ θvj(sk, sk) and (1− ρk,ki ) tk ≤ vi(sk, sk+1)− ρk,ki θvj(sk, sk).
for k = 0, 1, . . . ,K. These clearly hold when k = 0 since vi(s
0, s1) ≥ vj(s0, s0) by
Assumption 2. For k ≥ 1, (9) implies that tk satisÞes
tk = ρk−1,kj vi(s
k−1, sk) + ρk−1,k−1i {1− ρk−1,kj } θvj(sk−1, sk−1)
+ {1− ρk−1,k−1i }{1− ρk−1,kj } tk−1.
(10)
Suppose that tk−1 ≤ θvj(sk−1, sk−1). Then (10) implies that
tk ≤ ρk−1,kj vi(sk−1, sk) + ρk−1,k−1i {1− ρk−1,kj } θvj(sk−1, sk−1)
+ {1− ρk−1,k−1i }{1− ρk−1,kj } θvj(sk−1, sk−1)
= ρk−1,kj vi(s
k−1, sk) + {1− ρk−1,kj } θvj(sk−1, sk−1).
It can be veriÞed that the RHS is ≤ θvj(sk, sk) if and only if θ ≥ θij . Suppose next
that
(1− ρk−1,k−1i ) tk−1 ≤ vi(sk−1, sk)− ρk−1,k−1i θvj(sk−1, sk−1).
It then follows from (10) that
tk ≤ ρk−1,kj vi(sk−1, sk)
+ ρk−1,k−1i {1− ρk−1,kj } θvj(sk−1, sk−1)
+ {1− ρk−1,kj }
©
vi(s
k−1, sk)− ρk−1,k−1i θvj(sk−1, sk−1)
ª
= vi(s
k−1, sk).
Since θ ≤ 1, Assumption 2 implies that
(1− ρk,ki ) vi(sk−1, sk) ≤ vi(sk, sk+1)− ρk,ki θvj(sk, sk).
We hence obtain the desired conclusion. Note now that from (9), ∆ki = xi(s
k) −
xi(s
k−1) and ∆kj = xj(s
k)− xj(sk−1) can be expressed in terms of tk−1 as
∆ki = ρ
k−1,k
j
h
vi(s
k−1, sk)− tk−1 − ρk−1,k−1i
©
θvj(s
k−1, sk−1)− tk−1ªi,(11)
∆kj = ρ
k−1,k−1
i
h
vj(s
k−1, sk−1)− 1
θ
tk−1
i
(12)
for k = 1, . . . ,K. The above conclusions then imply that ∆ki , ∆
k
j ≥ 0 for k =
1, . . . , K.
26
Step 2 yi and yj satisfy the local incentive constraints.
Let πi(si, si | d, y) denote bidder is (interim) expected payoff under the instruc-
tion rule d and the continuation payoff function proÞle y when he observes signal
si and reports si, and bidder j reports his signal truthfully. The global incentive
conditions can be expressed as:
πi(si, si | dij∗, y) ≥ πi(si, si | dij∗, y)(13)
for any si, si ∈ Si, and
πj(sj , sj | dij∗, y) ≥ πj(sj , sj | dij∗, y)(14)
for any sj , sj ∈ Sj . This step shows that xi and xj deÞned in (9) satisfy the local
or one-step incentive compatibility constraints.
We Þrst note that xi and xj deÞned in (9) satisfy the inequalities (15)-(18) below.
1
ρk−1,kj
∆ki + θ∆
k
j ≥ vi(sk−1, sk)− tk−1,(15)
1
ρk,kj
∆ki + θ∆
k
j ≤ vi(sk, sk)− tk−1,(16)
1
ρk−1,k−1i
∆kj ≥ vj(sk−1, sk−1)−
1
θ
tk−1,(17)
1
ρk,k−1i
∆kj ≤ vj(sk, sk−1)−
1
θ
tk−1.(18)
It can be readily veriÞed that xi and xj satisfy (15) and (17) with equality. Since
∆ki , ∆
k
j ≥ 0 by Step 1, (16) holds since ρk,kj ≥ ρk−1,kj and vi(sk, sk) ≥ vi(sk−1, sk),
and (18) holds since ρk,k−1i ≥ ρk−1,k−1i and vj(sk, sk−1) ≥ vj(sk−1, sk−1).
We now show that (15)-(18) above correspond to the local incentive constraints.
For y given in (2), πi(si, si | dij∗, y) can be written as
πi(si, si | dij∗, y) =
X
sj≤si
vi(si, sj) pj(sj | si)
− xi(si)
X
sj≤si
pj(sj | si) +
X
sj>si
θxj(sj) pj(sj | si).
Hence, (13) for si = s
k−1 and si = sk (i.e., the one-step upward incentive com-
patibility condition) is equivalent to (k = 1, . . . ,K):
πi(s
k−1, sk−1 | dij∗, y)− πi(sk−1, sk | dij∗, y)
= −vi(sk−1, sk) pj(sk | si = sk−1) + xi(sk−1) pj(sk | si = sk−1)
+ θxj(s
k) pj(s
k | si = sk−1) +∆ki
X
sj≤sk
pj(sj | si = sk−1) ≥ 0,
(19)
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and (13) for si = s
k and si = s
k−1 (i.e., the one-step downward incentive com-
patibility condition) is equivalent to:
πi(s
k, sk | dij∗, y)− πi(sk, sk−1 | dij∗, y)
= vi(s
k, sk) pj(s
k | si = sk)− xi(sk−1) pj(sk | si = sk)
− θxj(sk) pj(sk | si = sk)−∆ki
X
sj≤sk
pj(sj | si = sk) ≥ 0.
(20)
Rearranging, we see that (19) and (20) are equivalent to (15) and (16), respectively.
For bidder j, πj(sj , sj | dij∗, y) can be written as
πj(sj , sj | dij∗, y) =
X
si<sj
vj(sj , si) pi(si | sj)
− xj(sj)
X
si<sj
pi(si | sj) +
X
si≥sj
θ−1xi(si) pi(si | sj).
Hence, (14) for sj = s
k−1 and sj = sk is equivalent to (k = 1, . . . ,K):
πj(s
k−1, sk−1 | dij∗, y)− πj(sk−1, sk | dij∗, y)
= −vj(sk−1, sk−1) pi(sk−1 | sj = sk−1) + xj(sk−1) pi(sk−1 | sj = sk−1)
+ θ−1xi(sk−1) pi(sk−1 | sj = sk−1) +∆kj
X
si≤sk−1
pi(si | sj = sk−1) ≥ 0,
(21)
and (14) for si = s
k and si = s
k−1 is equivalent to:
πj(s
k, sk | dij∗, y)− πj(sk, sk−1 | dij∗, y)
= vj(s
k, sk−1) pi(sk−1 | sj = sk)− xj(sk−1) pi(sk−1 | sj = sk)
− θ−1xi(sk−1) pi(sk−1 | sj = sk)−∆kj
X
si≤sk−1
pi(si | sj = sk) ≥ 0.
(22)
Rearrangement shows that (21) and (22) are equivalent to (17) and (18), respectively.
Step 3 yi and yj satisfy the global incentive constraints (13) and (14).
As an induction hypothesis, suppose that (13) holds for si = s
k−1 and si = sk+l−1
(l = 1, . . . ,K − k). When si = sk−1 and si = sk+l, we have
πi(s
k−1, sk−1 | dij∗, y)− πi(sk−1, sk+l | dij∗, y)
= πi(s
k−1, sk−1 | dij∗, y)− πi(sk−1, sk+l−1 | dij∗, y)
+
©−vi(sk−1, sk+l) + θxj(sk+l) + xi(sk+l−1)ª pj(sk+l | si = sk−1)
+∆k+li
X
sj≤sk+l
pj(sj | si = sk−1).
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By the induction hypothesis, the RHS is ≥ 0 if
− vi(sk−1, sk+l) + θxj(sk+l) + xi(sk+l−1) +∆k+li
P
sj≤sk+l pj(sj | si = sk−1)
pj(sk+l | si = sk−1)
= −vi(sk−1, sk+l) + θ∆k+lj + tk+l−1 +
1
ρk−1,k+lj
∆k+li ≥ 0,
or equivalently,
1
ρk−1,k+lj
∆k+li + θ∆
k+l
j ≥ vi(sk−1, sk+l)− tk+l−1.
Since ρk−1,k+lj ≤ ρk+l−1,k+lj by (1) and vi(sk−1, sk+l) ≤ vi(sk+l−1, sk+l), (15) for
k+ l implies the above inequality. Therefore, (13) holds for si = s
k−1 and si = sk+l
(k = 1, . . . ,K, l = 0, . . . ,K − k− 1). We can show by an analogous argument that
(14) holds for si = s
k and si = s
k−l (k = 1, . . . , K, l = 1, . . . , k). The argument for
j is similar and is omitted. //
Proof of Theorem 5 Take any u ∈ V 0∩V , and let α 6= 0 be given. If α1, α2 ≤ 0,
then we have α · u ≤ α · g0. If αi > 0 and αj ≤ 0, then we have α · u ≤ α · gi (i = 1,
2, j 6= i). In both cases, we are done since d0, di ∈ A(α) by Lemma 2. Suppose
then that αi ≥ αj > 0. If α · u ≤ α · gi for i = 1 or 2, then the proof is complete
again by Lemma 2. Otherwise, since u ∈ V , we must have α · u < α · gφ∗ for either
φ = ij or φ = ji. Since gij∗i + g
ij∗
j = g
ji∗
i + g
ji∗
j and g
ij∗
j ≤ gji∗j , we also have
α · (gij∗ − gji∗) = (αi − αj)(gji∗j − gij∗j ) ≥ 0.
Therefore, α · u ≤ α · gij∗ must hold. If dij∗ ∈ A(α), then the proof is complete.
Otherwise, αj/αi < θij must hold by Lemma 4 and hence u ∈ V 0 implies that
α · u = αi
³
ui +
αj
αi
uj
´
≤ αi(ui + θijuj) ≤ αi gii = α · gi.
We hence obtain the desired conclusion. //
Proof of Theorem 7 The desired conclusion follows if gij∗ = (gij∗i , g
ij∗
j ) ∈ V 0 for
i 6= j, where gij∗ is the payoff vector corresponding to the efficient instruction rule
dij∗. For this, it suffices to show that gij∗i + θijg
ij∗
j ≤ gii (i = 1, 2, j 6= i): If this
holds, then we also have gij∗j + θjig
ij∗
i ≤ gjj since gij∗j + θjigij∗i ≤ gji∗j + θjigji∗i by
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gij∗i + g
ij∗
j = g
ji∗
i + g
ji∗
j and g
ij∗
i ≥ gji∗i . We have
θkij =
ρk−1,kj vi(s
k−1, sk)
vj(sk, sk)− vi(sk−1, sk−1) + ρk−1,kj vi(sk−1, sk−1)
=
ρk−1,kj (k − c)
1 + ρk−1,kj (k − 1)
for any k = 1, . . . , K, and
gii − gij∗i
gij∗j
=
P
sj>si
p(s) vi(s)P
sj>si
p(s) vj(s)
=
c
P
sj>si
p(s) si + (1− c)
P
sj>si
p(s) sj
(1− c)Psj>si p(s) si + cPsj>si p(s) sj
=
1− c+ cνij
(1− c)νij + c .
It can be seen from these that the inequality in the theorem is equivalent to θij ≤
gii−gij∗i
gij∗j
, which in turn implies gij∗i + θijg
ij∗
j ≤ gii. //
Proof of Lemma 9 By the theorem of the alternatives (Rockafellar (1970, The-
orem 22.1)), (5) has a solution if and only if for any γ ∈ Rs+,
γB = 0 ⇒
nX
i=1
γi · vi ≤ 0.
Take any γ ∈ Rs+ and write γ = (γ1, . . . , γn), where γi is mi-dimensional. Simple
algebra shows that γ B = 0 is equivalent to
γiBi − βiγnBn = 0 for i = 1, . . . , n− 1,
and that γ · v ≤ 0 is equivalent to
nX
i=1
γi · vi ≤ 0.
Hence, the desired conclusion follows. //
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Proof of Lemma 11 Fix any sj ∈ Sj . For any λj ∈ Λj ,
bj(λj) · z =
X
s∈S
©
p(s | λ∗)− p(s | λj ,λ∗−j)
ª
z(s)
=
X
s−j∈S−j
z(sj , s−j)
X
sj∈Sj
©
p(sj , s−j | λ∗)− p(sj , s−j | λj ,λ∗−j)
ª
=
X
s−j∈S−j
z(sj , s−j)
©
p(s−j | λ∗−j)− p(s−j | λ∗−j)
ª
= 0,
where the second equality follows since z(s0j , s−j) = z(sj , s−j) for any s
0
j ∈ Sj . //
Proof of Lemma 12 As in the proof of Lemma 4, let πi(si, si | d, y) denote bidder
is (interim) expected payoff under the instruction rule d and the continuation payoff
function y when he has signal si and reports si, and other bidders report their signals
truthfully. Write d(· | φ, J) = d, wji (· | φ, J) = wji (·) and Z¯i(· | φ, J) = Z¯i(·) for
simplicity. The conclusion follows if
πi(si, si | d, y) ≥ πi(si, si | d, y)(23)
for any si 6= si. Note Þrst that xi deÞned in (8) satisÞes (24) and (25) below for
k = 1, . . . ,K:
xi(s
k) ≥ ρkj wji (sk−1, sk) + (1− ρkj ) xi(sk−1),(24)
xi(s
k) ≤ ρkj wji (sk, sk) + (1− ρkj ) xi(sk−1),(25)
xi satisÞes (24) with equality, and hence also satisÞes (25) since w
j
i (s
k−1, sk) ≤
wji (s
k, sk) by (6).
We next show that xi satisÞes the local incentive conditions. In other words,
(23) holds for si = s
k when si = s
k−1 or si = sk+1. Note that when yi = z for z
given in (7), πi(si, si | d, y) can be written as
πi(si, si | d, y) =
X
s−i∈Z¯i(si)
{vi(si, s−i)−R} p−i(s−i)− xi(si)
X
sj≤si
pj(sj).
Hence, (23) for si = s
k−1 and si = sk is equivalent to
πi(s
k−1, sk−1 | d, y)− πi(sk−1, sk | d, y)
= −wji (sk−1, sk) pj(sk) + xi(sk)
X
sj≤sk
pj(sj)− xi(sk−1)
X
sj≤sk−1
pj(sj) ≥ 0.(26)
Since
P
sj≤sk−1 pj(sj) = (1 − ρkj )
P
sj≤sk pj(sj), (26) simpliÞes to (24). Likewise,
(23) for si = s
k and si = s
k−1 is equivalent to (25).
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We now show that xi satisÞes the global incentive conditions: (23) holds for any
si and si.
As an induction hypothesis, suppose that (23) holds for si = s
k−1 and si = sk+l−1
(l = 1, . . . ,K − k). When si = sk−1 and si = sk+l, we have
πi(s
k−1, sk−1 | d, y)− πi(sk−1, sk+l | d, y)
= πi(s
k−1, sk−1 | d, y)− πi(sk−1, sk+l−1 | d, y)
− wji (sk−1, sk+l) pj(sk+l) + xi(sk+l)
X
sj≤sk+l
pj(sj)− xi(sk+l−1)
X
sj≤sk+l−1
pj(sj),
By the induction hypothesis, the RHS is ≥ 0 if
− wji (sk−1, sk+l) pj(sk+l) + xi(sk+l)
X
sj≤sk+l
pj(sj)− xi(sk+l−1)
X
sj≤sk+l−1
pj(sj)
=
n
xi(s
k+l)− ρk+lj wji (sk−1, sk+l)− (1− ρk+lj ) xi(sk+l−1)
o X
sj≤sk+l
pj(sj) ≥ 0.
Since wji (s
k−1, sk+l) ≤ wji (sk+l−1, sk+l) by (6), (24) for k + l implies the above
inequality. Therefore, (23) holds for s = sk−1 and s = sk+l (k = 1, . . . , K, l =
0, . . . , K − k − 1). An analogous argument shows that (23) holds for si = sk and
si = s
k−l (k = 1, . . . , K, l = 1, . . . , k). This completes the proof. //
Proof of Lemma 14 Write k · k for the square norm, and let z ∈ Gj be deÞned
by z(si, sj , s−i−j) = z¯(si, s−i−j) for any (si, sj , s−i−j) ∈ S, where
z¯(si, ·) = p−i−j(· | si)kp−i−j(· | si)k .
Then for any si, s
0
i ∈ Si,
z¯(si, ·) · p−i−j(· | si) = p−i−j(· | si) · p−i−j(· | si)kp−i−j(· | si)k = kp−i−j(· | si)k, and
z¯(s0i, ·) · p−i−j(· | si) =
p−i−j(· | s0i) · p−i−j(· | si)
kp−i−j(· | s0i)k
.
If si 6= s0i, then p−i−j(· | si) 6= p−i−j(· | s0i) by Assumption 6 and hence by the
Cauchy-Schwartz inequality,
p−i−j(· | si) · p−i−j(· | s0i) < kp−i−j(· | si)k kp−i−j(· | s0i)k.
It follows that
z¯(si, ·) · p−i−j(· | si) > z¯(s0i, ·) · p−i−j(· | si).
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This further implies that for any λi ∈ Λ0i , we have
bi(λi) · z =
X
si∈Si
p(si)
©
z¯(si, ·) · p−i−j(· | si)− z¯(λi(si), ·) · p−i−j(· | si)
ª
> 0,
or equivalently, Bi z > 0. Therefore, we have Bi z ≥ vi if we redeÞne z to be kz for
k > 0 sufficiently large. //
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